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CLOSING IN ON THE LIGHT AT WIPO: MOVEMENT 
TOWARDS A COPYRIGHT TREATY FOR VISUALLY 
IMPAIRED PERSONS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
MOVEMENTS 
SEAN WILLIAMS* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Large-scale distribution of the written word has spurred an era 
of exponential societal and cultural development.  Indeed, since the 
advent of the printing press, the spread of widely disseminated 
written discourse has bred heightened innovation as individuals 
build upon others’ innovations through information exchange via 
mass print.1  The rise of the modern Information Age has only 
 
* Executive Editor, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law.  J.D. 
Candidate, 2012, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Thank you to the 
Volume 33 Executive Board, all of our editors, and Professor Shyam Balganesh for 
his thoughtful guidance.  I owe particular gratitude to my parents who continue 
to support me in all that I do.  Lastly, I also owe immense gratitude to Anna, who 
has stuck by my side and supported me throughout law school and beyond.  Any 
mistakes are my own. 
1 For example, vast expansion of science and scholarship occurred in the 
wake of the printing press.  See JOHN MAN, GUTENBERG: HOW ONE MAN REMADE 
THE WORLD WITH WORDS 254 (2002): 
For the first time specialists could agree on their agendas and feed off 
each other . . . . Once, the norms of classical architecture were known 
only from a few hand-copied manuscripts . . . . Now Vitruvius, who laid 
down the rules of classical architecture around the time of Christ, could 
be reproduced in all major languages, and architects armed with the 
works of Vitruvius’s modern disciples . . . could eventually re-create 
Greek and Roman glories in estates . . . . 
See also MARYANNE WOLF, PROUST AND THE SQUID: THE STORY AND SCIENCE OF THE 
READING BRAIN 216 (2007): 
Learning to read released the species from many of the former 
limitations of human memory.  Suddenly our ancestors could access 
knowledge that would no longer need to be repeated over and over 
again, and that could expand greatly as a result.  Literacy made it 
unnecessary to reinvent the wheel and thus made possible the more 
sophisticated inventions that would follow, like a machine that can read 
to those who can’t . . . . 
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accelerated the exponential dissemination of information.2  Even in 
the present-day era of technological expansion, written discourse 
remains a preeminent form of knowledge and information 
exchange—an exchange that is vital to a well-functioning 
democratic society and continued societal growth.3  While written 
discourse remains the principal vehicle for exchanging society’s 
most sophisticated knowledge, visually impaired persons (“VIPs”)4 
lack meaningful access to the vast majority of such written 
discourse in accessible formats, particularly those VIPs residing in 
developing countries. 
The World Health Organization (“WHO”) estimates that 
approximately 314 million VIPs reside throughout the world.5  Of 
 
2 See Amy Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge: A Conceptual Genealogy, in ACCESS 
TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 17, 17 (Gaëlle Krikorian & 
Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010) (“[N]ew information-processing technologies have 
made certain kinds of knowledge and information increasingly critical to the 
accumulation and distribution of global wealth.”). 
3 See INT’L FED’N OF LIBRARY ASS’NS & INSTS. (IFLA) Limitations and Exceptions 
to Copyright and Neighbouring Rights in the Digital Environment: An International 
Library Perspective, 3 (Revised ed. 2004), available at http://www.ifla.org/files/ 
clm/position_papers/ilp.pdf, which states: 
A full and comprehensive exchange of information is necessary for the 
functioning of a healthy democracy.  A society which is unable to access 
the knowledge required for a proper discussion of political, social, 
environmental or economic issues will not be able to achieve the kind of 
broad consensus upon which a healthy society is based . . . . 
See also Gaëlle Krikorian, Access to Knowledge as a Field of Activism, in ACCESS TO 
KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 2, at 57, 58 
(“Information and knowledge are the raw material of which immaterial goods, 
ideas, and inventions are made, and as such, they are key to individual as well as 
collective human development and welfare.”). 
4 This Comment typically refers to VIPs generally and does not confine itself 
to a specific definition of VIPs.  As this Comment notes later, however, the scope 
of individuals who should be classified as VIPs for the purposes of a VIP treaty 
remains an issue of contention throughout the treaty negotiations.  See infra notes 
80, 88, 102, 112, 126 and accompanying text (discussing varying VIP definitions 
proposed in the various VIP treaty proposals). 
5 World Health Organization [WHO], Prevention of Avoidable Blindness and 
Visual Impairment, Rep. by the Secretariat to the World Health Assembly, 62d sess, 
May 18–22, 2009, Annex, ¶ 1, WHO Doc. A62/7 (Apr. 2, 2009) [hereinafter WHO 
VIP Report], available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A62/A62_7-
en.pdf.  Based on the most recent report of the Census Bureau, estimating the 
world’s population at more than seven billion, VIPs make up roughly four percent 
of the world population.  See World POPClock Projection, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/population/popclockworld.html (last visited Apr. 7, 
2012).  However, some scholars have suggested that the WHO may actually vastly 
underestimate the number of VIPs worldwide, indicating that VIPs may make up 
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these 314 million VIPs, the WHO further estimates that ninety 
percent reside in developing countries.6  Furthermore, a report of 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) has 
reported that only roughly five percent of published written works 
are available in formats accessible to VIPs (“accessible written 
works”).7  In developing countries, the availability of accessible 
written works drops even sharper.  One commentator has 
suggested that the percentage of accessible written works in 
developing countries may be as low as 0.5%.8 
In a global system where written discourse continues to 
underlie intellectual growth, this dearth of accessible written 
works deprives society of a significant group of potential 
innovators.  VIPs, who would otherwise build upon ideas 
expressed in written works and subsequently contribute new 
innovations, cannot do so efficiently.  Perhaps more 
fundamentally, VIPs’ lack of access to accessible written works also 
deprives them of a fundamental vehicle for participating in 
sophisticated discourse and cultural exchange.9  Likewise, VIPs in 
developing countries are particularly deprived of such cultural 
participation.  Thus, under the existing system, VIPs—particularly 
those VIPs in developing countries—are deprived of a 
 
an even larger percentage of the world population.  See COPY/SOUTH RESEARCH 
GRP., THE COPY/SOUTH DOSSIER: ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY 
OF COPYRIGHT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 127–28 (Alan Story et al. eds., 2006).   
6 WHO VIP Report, supra note 5. 
7 World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Study on Copyright Limitations and 
Exceptions for the Visually Impaired, Standing Comm. Copyright & Related Rights, 
15th sess, Sept. 11–13, 2006, WIPO Doc. SCCR/15/7 (Feb. 20, 2007) (prepared by 
Judith Sullivan) [hereinafter WIPO Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for 
the Visually Impaired], available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/ 
en/sccr_15/sccr_15_7.pdf.  Even accounting for any unforeseen data or statistical 
shortcomings, WIPO’s estimate still strongly underscores the scant availability of 
written works in formats accessible to VIPs. 
8 Denise Nicholson, Copyright vs. the Right to Read, AFR. COPYRIGHT & ACCESS 
TO KNOWLEDGE PROJECT (ACA2K) BLOG (May 27, 2010, 9:13 AM), 
http://www.aca2k.org/index.php?option=com_idoblog&task=viewpost&id=27&
Itemid=73&lang=en. 
9 Indeed, VIPs’ inability to meaningfully access most written discourse 
arguably deprives them of the right under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights to meaningfully participate in cultural exchange.  See Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights art. 27(1), G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 
10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits.”). 
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fundamental means for cultural participation and cannot as 
effectively contribute to societal innovation. 
Copyright law, which provides rights holders exclusive rights 
over written works in order to stimulate innovation,10 restricts 
dissemination of accessible written works in many countries.11  
Indeed, as of 2007, less than half of WIPO’s member states 
provided copyright limitations and exceptions for converting 
copyrighted works into VIP-accessible formats.12  In this vein, 
international intellectual property  law has long resisted erosion of 
the status quo of granting rights holders strong intellectual 
property (“IP”) protections.  Consequently, IP movements 
demanding greater flexibility in IP law (IP reform movements) 
have recently mobilized.  Two such movements are the Access to 
Knowledge Movement (“A2K”) and the WIPO Development 
Agenda.13  Forming in the background of these movements, WIPO 
is currently developing a treaty that would establish a copyright 
law exception amongst its member states for converting written 
copyrighted works into accessible written works to distribute to 
VIPs.14 
 
10 See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION 
ECONOMY 6–7 (3d ed. 2010) (detailing copyright law’s incentive-based normative 
underpinning). 
11 See COPY/SOUTH RESEARCH GRP., supra note 5, at 129–30 (discussing ways in 
which copyright law restricts dissemination of accessible written works).  Another 
scholar explains that dissemination of accessible written works to VIPs can be  
restricted by copyright since [such exclusive rights] belong to the 
exclusive economic rights of the rightholder and his permission must be 
acquired in advance, in the case of usage of a copyright protected work . 
. . . Without copyright clearance and without the existence of an 
exception, print disabled encounter insurmountable obstacles accessing 
works and consequently receiving information. 
Maria-Daphne Papadopoulou, Copyright Exceptions and Limitations for Persons 
with Print Disabilities: The Innovative Greek Legal Framework Against the 
Background of the International and European Developments 4 (Sept. 14, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1874620. 
12 WIPO Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for the Visually Impaired, 
supra note 7, § 2.1. 
13 Referring to the WIPO Development Agenda as a “movement” is 
somewhat misleading insofar as it is a formal adoption of WIPO.  Nonetheless, for 
simplicity’s sake, this Comment will still refer to the WIPO Development Agenda 
more broadly as a movement. 
14 At the time of publication, a VIP treaty remains under negotiation and, 
therefore, this Comment will not account for any developments occurring after 
March of 2012. 
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Ultimately, this Comment will argue that even though a VIP 
treaty might seemingly affect only a limited class of individuals, it 
stands to signify an instrumental step forward towards 
acknowledging A2K and implementing the WIPO Development 
Agenda.  Admittedly, no VIP treaty will be wholly without defect.  
Indeed, negotiations have stalled somewhat at times due to policy 
divides between developed and developing countries, and any 
final agreement will likely reflect significant compromise.  
Nonetheless, ratification of a VIP treaty should ultimately enrich 
and legitimize the standing of IP reform movements. 
Section 2 of this Comment will briefly discuss certain 
components of international copyright law.  It will focus on 
copyright law’s traditional focus on protecting rights holders, even 
as developing countries call for increased flexibility.  Section 3 will 
discuss IP reform movements with a particular focus upon A2K 
and the WIPO Development Agenda.  Section 4 will examine the 
VIP treaty proposals currently before WIPO.  The proposals 
include two initial developing country proposals, two initial 
developed country proposals, as well as a subsequent 2011 
proposal that seeks to strike a compromise between the four initial 
proposals.  Discussion of the proposals in Section 4 will underscore 
how developing countries attempt to render IP law more flexible 
while developed countries attempt to maintain more restrained 
approaches.  It will also highlight ways in which VIP treaty 
proposals enhance and/or endorse A2K and the WIPO 
Development Agenda.  Finally, Section 5 addresses some of the 
critiques that opponents have put forth in opposition to adopting 
an international VIP treaty. 
2. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW’S TRADITIONAL ADHERENCE 
TO STRONG PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
2.1. The Berne Convention and the 1967 Stockholm Conference 
The Berne Convention is the primary treaty underlying 
international copyright law.15  Since its founding, its primary 
 
15 See, e.g., MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP 
TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT 
LAW 43 (2004) (“[T]he Berne Convention can be characterized as a limited kind of 
international copyright codification.”).  The Berne Convention has been signed by 
165 countries.  Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
04 WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  3:28 PM 
1040 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:4 
guiding objective has been “to protect . . . the rights of authors in 
literary and artistic works . . . .”16  Consequently, the Berne 
Convention has not expressly required that countries promulgate 
balanced IP legal systems.17  Indeed, consistent with its rights 
protection-oriented spirit, it has been interpreted to authorize 
signatories to implement more stringent copyright laws,18 while 
limitations and exceptions may not be introduced unless specific 
conditions are met under the “three-step test.”19 
The Berne Convention periodically undergoes revisions.20  
During the 1967 Stockholm Conference to Amend the Berne 
Convention (“Stockholm Conference”) the Berne Convention’s 
developing countries21 pushed for copyright reforms aimed at 
 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15 (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2012). 
16 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works pmbl., 
Sept. 9, 1886, 102 Stat. 1853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].  See 
also Sam Ricketson, International Conventions and Treaties, in THE BOUNDARIES OF 
COPYRIGHT: ITS PROPER LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 2, 6 (Libby Baulch et al. eds., 
1998) (laying out the guiding principles of the Berne Convention). 
17 Ricketson, supra note 16, at 6. 
18 For instance, the Berne Convention is generally described as implementing 
minimum standards of protection rather than maximum standards.  See e.g., Alan 
Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright Convention Must be 
Repealed, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 763, 789 (2004) (noting that the Berne Convention 
merely establishes minimum standards of protection, and allows signatories the 
ability to implement stronger protections at their discretion). 
19 Under Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, a country may provide an 
exception to its copyright laws if it meets what is now commonly referred to as 
the Berne “three-step test.”  Berne Convention, supra note 16, art. 9(2).  Under the 
three-step test, limitations and exceptions must be limited “(1) to ‘certain special 
cases,’ (2) ‘which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work,’ and (3) 
which ‘do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.’”  
P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth L. Okediji, Contours of an International Instrument on 
Limitations and Exceptions, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 473, 482 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2009). 
20 Revisions generally occur approximately once every twenty years.  
SENFTLEBEN, supra note 15, at 44.  For an overview of the several Berne Convention 
revisions, see 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 
AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 85–149 (2d ed. 
2006) (providing an in-depth treatment of the Berne Convention’s various 
revisions). 
21 At the time, developing countries only constituted approximately one-
third of the Berne Convention’s members.  RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 20, 
at 121.  In the prior amendment conference, however, developing countries only 
consisted of approximately four percent of the signatories to the Berne 
Convention.  Id.  Notably, the United States was not a signatory of the Berne 
Convention until 1988.  See Copyright Law of the United States of America and Related 
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providing heightened accommodation to their developmental 
needs.  For Example, a coalition of developing countries demanded 
that the Berne Convention better accommodate their “economic, 
social, cultural, and technological needs.”22  Within that coalition, 
India, for example, called for copyright flexibilities to better assist 
it in achieving social progress, such as increasing literacy.23 
Western response to the developing countries’ proposals, 
nonetheless, aptly personified the Berne Convention’s resistance to 
making concessions towards copyright balance.  The United 
Kingdom insisted that maintaining strong copyright regimes far 
outweighed any benefits of establishing new flexibilities to aid 
developing countries.24  Ultimately, the Western signatories largely 
succeeded in striking down concessions to developing countries 
and, notwithstanding certain concessions made during the 1971 
revision,25 the Berne Convention has mostly eschewed facilitation 
of any additional copyright balance.26 
 
Laws Contained in Title 17 of the United States Code, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
http://www.copyright.gov/title17/92appii.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
22 Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465, 
476 (2009). 
23 Salah Basalamah, Compulsory Licensing for Translation: An Instrument of 
Development?, 40 IDEA 503, 507 (2007) (summarizing the negotiations conducted at 
the 1967 Stockholm Conference). 
24 Id. at 507–08. 
25 Berne Convention, supra note 16, app., art. 1 (providing certain copyright 
concessions to accommodate developing countries).  See also Module 2: The 
International Framework, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y & ELECTRONIC INFO. 
FOR LIBRARIES, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/copyrightforlibrarians/Module_2:_ 
The_International_Framework#Berne_Convention (describing the 1971 revision, 
“which permits developing countries to grant non-exclusive and non-transferable 
compulsory licenses to translate works for the purpose of teaching, scholarship or 
research, and to reproduce works for use in connection with systematic 
instructional activities”).  But see Story, supra note 18, at 768–69 (“The one addition 
made to Berne during that era which purported to improve the situation of poor 
countries—incorporation of the Paris Appendix—has certainly not done so.  And 
there is nothing in the current international economic environment that suggests 
that radical reforms to Berne would be any more likely today than in the 1960s.”). 
26 See Yu, supra note 22, at 480–82 (noting that the developing country 
proposals at the Stockholm Conference were largely defeated by developed 
countries, but some token compromises were made in recognition of the needs of 
developing countries). 
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2.2. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and 
Further Resistance to IP Flexibility 
Some have characterized the World Trade Organization’s 
(“WTO”) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”),27 which addresses the convergence of 
IP and trade,28 as an attempt to safeguard against developing 
countries that are advocating for a more flexible international IP 
law framework.29  Consequently, any country wishing to join the 
WTO must comply with TRIPS.30  To maintain strong intellectual 
property rights, TRIPS incorporated the Berne Convention’s 
existing copyright protections.31  Furthermore, it has been 
interpreted to allow countries to negotiate bilateral agreements 
mandating stronger IP protection than TRIPS’s already firm 
requirements (TRIPS-plus).32  Developed countries have exploited 
TRIPS-plus to pressure developing countries into adopting 
heightened IP protection, even where developing countries’ 
interests might otherwise be best served under more flexible IP 
regimes.33 
 
27 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 1867 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
28 Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions, 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 3, 11 
(Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
29 Id. at 7 (discussing the conditions under which the TRIPS Agreement was 
developed). 
30 Kapczynski, supra note 2, at 25; Peter Magic, International Technology 
Transfer & Intellectual Property Rights 2 (Nov. 30, 2003) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~fussell/courses/econtech/ 
public-final-papers/Peter_Magic_International_IP_Rights.pdf. 
31 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 20, at 353–55. 
32 See Xavier Seuba, Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra 
note 28, at 387, 414 (defining and discussing “TRIPS-plus”); see also Beatrice 
Lindstrom, Note, Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of Intellectual Property 
Provisions in Trade Agreements and Implications for Asia and the Pacific, 42 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 917, 918–19 (2010) (describing TRIPS-plus provisions that “exceed 
the standards agreed to at the WTO”). 
33 See, e.g., Pedro Paranaguá, Strategies to Implement the Development Agenda: A 
Brazilian Perspective, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATION’S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 140 (Jeremy de Beer ed., 2009) (describing 
the United States’ use of coercive diplomatic pressure to induce developing 
countries to agree to TRIPS-plus agreements).  The United States has similarly 
utilized bilateral negotiations to pressure developing countries to adopt the 
optional WIPO Copyright Treaty.  The treaty imposes additional protections 
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Moreover, perceived attempts at increased TRIPS flexibility 
have been met with resistance.  For instance, Article 8(1) of the 
TRIPS Agreement was originally proposed to allow IP law to better 
account for the demands of health-related concerns—“to protect 
public health and nutrition” and “to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development.”34 
Nonetheless, developed countries successfully insisted on 
appending a disclaimer to the proposal, requiring that “such 
measure be consistent with the provisions of [the remainder of 
TRIPS].”35  Many commentators viewed this disclaimer as an 
attempt to undermine, or even swallow, Article 8(1)’s public 
interest goals.36  Therefore, as with the 1967 Stockholm Conference, 
negotiation over TRIPS Article 8(1) helps underscore Western 
hesitation to make concessions to developing countries in the 
realm of intellectual property rights.  Furthermore, TRIPS has 
mostly maintained the status quo of strong IP protection in the 
international copyright law system.37 
2.3. World Intellectual Property Organization: Navigating Tension 
Between U.N. Developmental Objectives and Upholding 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Initially an independent governmental organization controlled 
primarily by “fifty-one mostly industrialized country 
governments,” WIPO is the leading international body governing 
 
beyond the Berne Convention, including implementation of criminal sanctions 
under certain circumstances.  See Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge 
Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 824 (2008) 
(remarking that the United States has induced developing countries to agree to 
bilateral treaties that require the developing countries to adopt the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty’s heightened copyright protections). 
34 TRIPS, supra note 27, art. 8(1).  This “public interest provision” was placed 
into TRIPS at the urging of developing countries.  See Yusuf, supra note 28, at 13–
14 (describing “the public interest principle” of TRIPS). 
35 Yusuf, supra note 28, at 14. 
36 See id. (discussing the potential confusion and ambiguity caused by the 
seemingly contradictory language in Article 8(1)).  Arguably though, the Doha 
Declaration later eliminated confusion by unambiguously reaffirming TRIPS’s 
accommodation of public health needs).  Id. at 14–15 
37 However, the Doha Declaration at least offered a slight recognition of 
enhanced IP balance in areas such as access to medicine.  Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
04 WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  3:28 PM 
1044 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:4 
IP.38  Under the belief that moving to the United Nations (“U.N.”) 
would promote “the protection of intellectual property throughout 
the world,” WIPO incorporated into the United Nations.39  As a 
division of the United Nations, WIPO—a traditionally Western-
controlled governmental organization—is now explicitly required 
to account for the developmental needs of developing countries.40 
Despite this edict, WIPO has often continued to urge stricter IP 
standards,41 and has taken steps to ensure that its “mission [is] 
adhered to unwaveringly.”42  Indeed, WIPO has often stood firmly 
behind rhetoric insisting that promoting strong IP protection 
would best spur development in developing countries.43  Certain 
scholars believe that WIPO’s IP protection-oriented approach to 
development operates as pretext to prevent developing countries 
from undermining WIPO’s tradition of strong IP protection.44  
 
38 MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE 
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 125 (1998). 
39 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. 
3(i), July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.  See also RYAN, supra note 38, at 
127.  Commentators have speculated, however, that WIPO joined the United 
Nations solely to strengthen intellectual property protection, even if to the 
detriment of developing countries’ development.  See Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Introduction: The WIPO Development Agenda and Its Development Policy Context, in 
THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 19, at 1, 3 n.5; Yu, supra note 22, at 476 
(articulating that developing countries have different needs in the realm of 
intellectual property). 
40 RYAN, supra note 38, at 133–34 (outlining steps taken by WIPO to address 
the intellectual property needs of developing countries after its incorporation into 
the United Nations).  The United Nations even expressly imposed this obligation 
upon WIPO as a condition to joining it.  Article 1 of the agreement incorporating 
WIPO into the U.N. stated that WIPO must “promot[e] intellectual activity and 
facilitat[e] the transfer of technology related to industrial property to developing 
countries in order to accelerate economic, social and cultural development.”  
Agreement between the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, art. 1, Dec. 17, 1974, WIPO Publication No. 111 (1975), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/agreement/pdf/un_wip_
agreement.pdf. 
41 See Seuba, supra note 32, at 416. 
42 RYAN, supra note 38, at 128. 
43 See Ruth L. Okediji, History Lessons for the WIPO Development Agenda, in 
THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 19, at 137, 145–47 (noting that even if WIPO 
possessed genuine concerns for developing countries, its focus upon establishing 
strong intellectual property rights in order to address these concerns has been 
ineffective). 
44 See Netanel, supra note 39, at 2 (“WIPO’s leadership refused to recognize 
any contradiction between . . . spurring development versus its traditional core 
objective of extending greater” intellectual property protection across the world). 
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Therefore, WIPO’s U.N.-imposed developmental goals prove 
difficult to reconcile with its objective of maintaining strong 
intellectual property rights.  Therefore, if effectively implemented, 
the WIPO Development Agenda stands to provide more backbone 
to the developmental obligations that WIPO must commit to as an 
arm of the U.N. 
3. IP REFORM MOVEMENTS 
3.1. Rise of IP Reform Movements 
Commentators have recently questioned whether strong IP 
enforcement aids development in developing countries.45  For 
instance, empirical evidence does not definitively prove that strong 
IP enforcement stimulates foreign direct investment in developing 
countries.46  Moreover, IP law often appears to concentrate 
technology and innovation within developed countries.47  
Furthermore, even the WTO has inched towards acknowledging a 
newly balanced system of IP via the Doha Declaration which 
provides that WTO members can “use fully the provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for” increased access to 
medicine—a position that the WHO has since endorsed.48  In the 
 
45 See, e.g., Alan Story, who argues: 
In becoming signatories to Berne, countries of the South, which are 
primarily copyright users, have not only become further oppressed by 
the copyright power and control, financial and otherwise, exercised by 
right countries in the present circumstance; such relationships and the 
agreement of poor countries to protect and enforce copyright in, for 
example, educational works of every description, until, at a minimum, 
fifty years after their authors die, has—and will have—truly monumental 
effects on those countries’ economic futures for decades, as well as their 
future use of materials. 
Story, supra note 18, at 773. 
46 See, e.g., Henrique Choer Moraes & Otávio Brandelli, The Development 
Agenda at WIPO: Context and Origins, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 19, 
at 33, 39–40 (quoting the World Bank’s 2005 Global Economic Prospects report 
questioning the correlation between intellectual property protection and foreign 
direct investment). 
47 See EMANUEL HASSAN ET AL., RAND CORP., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 19–20 (2010), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR804.pdf (noting 
that a better balancing of intellectual property rights actually helped stimulate 
innovation in certain developed countries). 
48 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 
4, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) (emphasis added).  The WHO has 
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wake of such concerns, movements have arisen calling for 
intellectual property laws to better accommodate certain societal 
concerns.49 
3.2. Access to Knowledge Movement (A2K) 
A2K, which eludes a strict definition,50 is a loose collection of 
movements calling for enhanced balance and flexibility in IP law.51  
At an extreme, certain A2K proponents wish to reorder IP law so 
that IP protection is the exception to an otherwise rather 
 
expressed support for the Doha Declaration.  Indeed, it encourages member states 
“to encourage trade agreements to take into account the flexibilities contained in 
[TRIPS] and recognized by the [Doha Declaration].”  Moraes & Brandelli, supra 
note 46, at 44.  Furthermore, a WHO Expert Commission adopted a similar stance 
on the need to exercise balance in intellectual property laws.  Id. 
49 See Kapczynski, supra note 33, at 825 (noting that “[o]ver the last ten to 
fifteen years . . . numerous groups have emerged to contest the recent expansion 
of intellectual property”).  Kapczynski identifies several distinct movements that 
have gained prominence, including (1) opposition to seed patents in India, (2) 
opposition to Western proposals to strengthen copyright protection of databases, 
(3) movements to increase access to HIV/AIDS medication in developing 
countries by providing accommodations in patent law, and (4) the use of 
affordable open-source software.  Id. at 825–29.  The HIV/AIDS access to 
medicine movement provides a useful snapshot of these IP reform movements 
and relies upon principles somewhat analogous to VIPs.  The movement 
attributed the unaffordability of HIV/AIDS medicine in developing countries to 
patent laws, which granted patent holders exclusive rights over the medicine.  Id. 
at 828–29.  Ultimately, the movement’s efforts yielded a dramatic ninety-nine 
percent reduction in the price of generic HIV/AIDS medication.  Id. 
50 Lea Shaver, Defining and Measuring Access to Knowledge: Towards an A2K 
Index 4 (Yale Law Sch. Legal Scholarship Repository, Faculty Scholarship Series 
Paper 22, 2007), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/22 
(noting that “there is currently no one authoritative explanation of what [A2K] 
encompasses”).  Another scholar has characterized the phenomenon as follows: 
“[S]ome groups have begun to seek to affiliate and make common cause under the 
rubric of [A2K] . . . . As they formulate these demands and work together, those 
involved are also seeking to develop a shared identity and a common critique of 
the existing intellectual property system.”  Kapczynski, supra note 33, at 806.  Lea 
Shaver has attempted to characterize A2K by developing a model which is based 
upon metrics corresponding to its defining characteristics.  See Shaver, supra, 
(establishing the following metrics: “[1] education for information literacy, [2] 
access to the global knowledge commons, [3] access to knowledge goods, [4] an 
enabling legal framework, and [5] effective innovation systems”). 
51 Krikorian, supra note 3, at 70–71 (noting A2K’s rather wide-ranging 
objectives and its loose composition of several diverse movements which still 
nonetheless seek a “common cause”).  Indeed, the movement has been described 
as “a heterogeneous collective inheriting its intentionality in the progression from 
the singular to the common in which the concept of access becomes itself a 
dispositive of the organization of singularities.”  Id. at 73. 
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uninhibited exchange of knowledge.52  More moderately, the 
movement pushes to render IP law more balanced in order to 
better facilitate a more open and efficient transfer of knowledge 
and information.53 
In 2005, the Consumer Project on Technology (“CPTech”)54 
even proposed an A2K treaty before WIPO; however, the treaty 
was not adopted.55  Directly applicable to VIPs, the treaty proposed 
that “[t]he dissemination of works in formats that enable access by 
disabled persons shall be permitted to any country that duly 
authorizes the non-voluntary use of such works.”56  This direct 
reference to disabled persons underscores A2K’s compatibility 
with a VIP treaty.  Thus, A2K’s emphasis on a richer exchange of 
 
52 See William New, Experts Debate Access to Knowledge, INTELL. PROP. WATCH 
(Feb. 15, 2005, 10:24 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2005/02/15/ 
experts-debate-access-to-knowledge/?res=1280_ff&print=0 (remarking that many 
A2K proponents believe that “restrictions on access ought to be the exception, not 
the other way around”); see generally Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Time for a 
Paradigm Shift?  Exploring Maximum Standards in International Intellectual Property 
Protection, 1 TRADE L. & DEV. 56 (2009) (arguing that IP protection should be 
governed by “maximum standards” or ceilings in order to balance users’ rights 
against those of IP rights holders). 
53 See, e.g., Ahmed Abdel Latif, The Emergence of the A2K Movement: 
Reminiscences and Reflections of a Developing-Country Delegate, in ACCESS TO 
KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 2, at 99, 102 
(describing a 2002 report of the UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 
which “underlined the need to achieve a more balanced international intellectual 
property system that would not be based on a ‘one size fits all’ approach . . . .”).  
Since definitions of A2K are somewhat broad and varied, this Comment does not 
necessarily endorse A2K at its most extreme, e.g., demanding a complete 
reordering of IP law.  However, this Comment does offer support to A2K insofar 
that normatively speaking, a proper IP law framework should attempt to strike a 
proper balance between stimulating creative works and preserving authors’ moral 
rights with allowing society an opportunity to access creative works for a net 
overall societal gain. 
54 CPTech (now Knowledge Ecology International) is an organization that 
compiled a large collection of information pertaining to, and in support of, the 
A2K movement.  Access to Knowledge: Overview, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH., 
http://www.cptech.org/a2k/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
55 Draft Treaty on Access to Knowledge, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH. (May 9, 
2005) [hereinafter Draft A2K Treaty], available at http://www.cptech.org/a2k/ 
a2k_treaty_may9.pdf.  See also Latif, supra note 53, 117 (noting that when the A2K 
treaty was proposed, “the A2K movement was fully formed and had come 
forward with a major norm-setting proposal.”). 
56 Draft A2K Treaty, supra note 55, art. 3-3(c).  Further lending credence to a 
VIP treaty, the A2K treaty called for members to recognize the “right to access 
knowledge through a diversity of formats to meet the individual’s specific needs.”  
Id. art. 3-3(a)(1). 
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knowledge—as is further exemplified by the A2K treaty 
proposal—provides a highly compatible normative underpinning 
to VIPs’ movement to increase the availability of accessible written 
works via copyright reform. 
3.3. WIPO Development Agenda 
The WIPO Development Agenda seeks for WIPO to better 
accommodate developmental concerns in its IP policies.57  A South 
American proposal at WIPO initiated talks towards a Development 
Agenda.58  The proposal underscored WIPO’s developmental 
obligations as a U.N. body, and it called for WIPO to implement a 
more nuanced approach to IP that better accounted for developing 
countries’ developmental needs, rather than rigidly continuing to 
promulgate heightened IP protection.59 
After rounds of negotiation, WIPO formally adopted the WIPO 
Development Agenda in 2007, enacting forty-five provisions60 
grouped within six distinct clusters.61  The Development Agenda 
stands to be a significant stride towards acknowledging 
developmental concerns at WIPO:  “[F]or the first time in WIPO’s 
history [the Development Agenda] place[d] the need for balance, 
flexibility and a robust public domain on par with promoting IP 
protection in all WIPO matters affecting developing countries.”62  
Formally acknowledging developing countries’ developmental 
 
57 See generally Decision of the 2007 General Assembly, WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/wo_ga/wo_ga_34_ 
summary.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (providing a general background 
chronicling the Development Agenda’s adoption). 
58 WIPO, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development 
Agenda for WIPO, Gen. Assembly, 31st (15th Extraordinary) sess, Sept. 27–Oct. 5, 
2004, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/wo_ga_31/wo_ga_31_11.pdf. 
59 Id. at Annex, at 2–3 [§§ III–V]. 
60 Decision of the 2007 General Assembly, supra note 57. 
61 See The 45 Adopted Recommendations Under the WIPO Development Agenda, 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/ 
recommendations.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Development Agenda 
Recommendations] (noting that the forty-five selected recommendations were 
chosen from over one-hundred proposals).  These clusters are: (A) “Technical 
Assistance and Capacity Building”; (B) “Norm-setting, flexibilities, public policy 
and public domain”; (C) “Technology Transfer, Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) and Access to Knowledge”; (D) “Assessment, Evaluation and 
Impact Studies”; (E) “Institutional Matters including Mandate and Governance”; 
and (F) “Other issues.”  Id. 
62 Netanel, supra note 39, at 2. 
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concerns pertaining to IP law certainly marks an important step 
forward from WIPO’s somewhat rigid roots.  However, the 
Development Agenda will prove toothless absent meaningful 
implementation through efforts to actually account for developing 
countries’ needs.  Due to the disproportionate concentration of 
VIPs in developing countries, adoption of a VIP treaty stands to 
pose a meaningful step towards this implementation. 
4. PROPOSED TREATIES FOR VISUALLY IMPAIRED PERSONS 
4.1. VIP-Related Concerns and the Shift Towards a VIP Treaty 
Addressing Copyright Barriers 
Forming within the background of the above-mentioned IP 
reform movements, a narrower complementary movement has 
demanded that VIPs obtain substantially more access to written 
works in accessible formats.63  Stemming from this complementary 
movement, a 2006 WIPO submission subsequently declared that 
“neither the market nor technology appears to be supporting a 
basis for facilitating the access to information by visually impaired 
people in a way that is consistent with the general standards for 
the full social and economic integration of people with 
disabilities.”64  Consequently, the submission asserted, copyright 
law provided an inadequate legal framework for sufficiently 
facilitating VIPs’ access to accessible written works.65 
 
63 Indeed, at the onset of the new millennium, VIP advocates began 
mobilizing support for IP reform.  See generally David Mann, WIPO—Advancing 
Access to Information for Print Disabled People, Meeting Paper of 67th IFLA Council 
and General Conference (Aug. 2001), available at http://keionline.org/sites/ 
default/files/david_manon_wipo.pdf (examining WIPO’s role related to VIP’s 
reading rights and copyright).  By 2004, the World Blind Union (WBU) formally 
declared that it would “strive for the creation of international agreements which 
would allow the unhindered transfer of accessible material created in one country 
to blind . . . people in another country.”  Policy Position Agreed by the World Blind 
Union (WBU), the Daisy Consortium and IFLA Libraries for the Blind Section (LBS) 
(World Blind Union et al., 2004), available at http://www.worldblindunion.org/ 
en/our-work/position-statements/Documents/wbu%20ifla%20lbs%20and% 
20daisy%20Joint%20Policy%20Position.doc. 
64 WIPO, Automated Rights Management Systems and Copyright Limitations and 
Exceptions, at 33, Standing Comm. Copyright & Related Rights, 14th sess, May 1–5, 
2006, WIPO Doc. SCCR/14/5 (Apr. 27, 2006) (prepared by Nic Garnett), available 
at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_14/sccr_14_5.pdf. 
65 See id. (stating that “given that there are no specific provisions in 
international law dealing with the needs of visually impaired people,” the current 
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Early discussion of a treaty addressing this defect possessed 
clear traces of the WIPO Development Agenda and A2K.  It 
recognized the need to “mov[e] towards agreement on exceptions 
and limitations for public interest purposes.”66  Moreover, there was a 
call for “access to the most vulnerable or socially prioritized 
sectors.”67  Discussion also demanded a “new reality” of a more 
balanced IP legal framework.68 
Emerging from this discussion, four VIP treaties were initially 
tabled before WIPO between 2009 and 2010:  (1) a joint proposal of 
three Latin American countries and the World Blind Union (“Latin 
American VIP Treaty”);69 (2) an African Group proposal (“African 
VIP Treaty”);70 (3) a European Union proposal (“EU VIP Treaty”);71 
 
copyright system does not provide a proper economic framework for 
dissemination of accessible written works). 
66 See WIPO, Proposal by Chile on the Analysis of Exceptions and Limitations, 
Annex, at 1, Standing Comm. Copyright & Related Rights, 13th sess, Nov. 21–23, 
2005, WIPO Doc. SCCR/13/5 (Nov. 22, 2005) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_13/sccr_13_5.pdf. 
67 Id. 
68 See id. at 2 [§ 2, para. 2] (“To maintain this balance between rightsholders 
and users, between authors and other rightsholders, and also among the 
rightsholders themselves, the intellectual property system makes use of the 
principles of exceptions and limitations.”). 
69 WIPO, Proposal by Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay, Relating to Limitations and 
Exceptions: Treaty Proposed by the World Blind Union (WBU), 18th sess, May 25–29, 
2009, WIPO Doc. SCCR/18/5 (May 25, 2009) [hereinafter Latin American VIP 
Treaty], available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_18/ 
sccr_18_5.pdf.  The Latin American proposal was the first proposal to be tabled 
before WIPO (during the Eighteenth Session of the WIPO Standing Committee on 
Copyright and Related Rights (“SCCR”) meeting) and served largely as the 
baseline proposal from which subsequent treaties and negotiations stemmed 
from.  The initial proposals of Africa, the European Union, and the United States 
were all proposed later during WIPO SCCR’s Twentieth Session in 2010. 
70 WIPO, Draft WIPO Treaty on Exceptions and Limitations for the Disabled, 
Educational and Research Institutions, Libraries and Archive Centers, Proposal by the 
African Group, Standing Comm. Copyright & Related Rights, 20th sess, June 21–24, 
2010, WIPO Doc. SCCR/20/11 (June 15, 2010), [hereinafter Africa VIP Treaty], 
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_20/sccr_20_ 
11.pdf. 
71 WIPO, Draft Joint Recommendation Concerning the Improved Access to Works 
Protected by Copyright for Persons with a Print Disability, Proposal by the Delegation of 
the European Union, Standing Comm. Copyright & Related Rights, 20th sess, June 
21–24, 2010, WIPO Doc. SCCR/20/12 (June 17, 2010) [hereinafter EU VIP Treaty], 
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_20/sccr_20_ 
12.pdf. 
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and (4) a United States proposal (“U.S. VIP Treaty”).72  The two 
developing countries’ proposals were binding,73 while the 
developed countries’ proposals were non-binding.74  In many 
respects, the four initial proposals aptly personify the disconnect 
between developing and developed countries’ approaches to IP 
balancing.  The developing countries’ proposals pushed for 
broader reforms while the developed countries’ proposals sought 
narrower reforms to avoid any scope of interpretation beyond 
VIPs.  In 2011, a compromise proposal was tabled at WIPO by most 
of the countries who submitted earlier proposals (with the 
exception of the African Group), and was joined by several new 
additional countries.75  Ultimately, all the proposals—even the 
 
72 WIPO, Draft Consensus Instrument, Proposal by the Delegation of the United 
States of America, Standing Comm. Copyright & Related Rights, 20th sess, June 21–
24, 2010, WIPO Doc. SCCR/20/10 (June 10, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. VIP Treaty], 
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_20/sccr_20_ 
10.pdf. 
73 See Latin American VIP Treaty, supra note 69, Annex, at 3 [pmbl.] 
(providing that the parties “[h]ave agreed as follows” to the subsequent treaty 
provisions); African VIP Treaty, supra note 70, at 3 [pmbl.]  (stating that 
signatories “[h]ereby agree on the following.”). 
74 See EU VIP Treaty, supra note 71, at 4 [Joint Recommendation, para. 4] 
(characterizing the treaty as a “recommendation” and stressing that it 
“[r]ecommend[s] that each Member State . . . bring[] its legislation into accord 
with this Recommendation”); U.S. VIP Treaty, supra note 72, at 2 [pmbl., para. 8] 
(describing the treaty as a “consensus instrument” and merely “[r]ecommend[ing] 
that each Member state adopt and implement the provisions” of the treaty). 
75 See WIPO, Proposal on an International Instrument on Limitations and 
Exceptions for Persons with Print Disabilities, Proposal by Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, the European Union and its Member States, Mexico, Norway, 
Paraguay, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, and Uruguay, Standing 
Comm. Copyright & Related Rights 22d sess, June 15–24, 2011, WIPO Doc. 
SCCR/22/15 Rev. 1 (June 22, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Combined VIP Treaty 
Proposal], available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_ 
22/sccr_22_15_rev.pdf.  Additional documents have since circulated at the WIPO 
SCCR proposing further revisions.  To the author’s best knowledge, the proposal 
cited above is the most recent formal compromise proposal tabled before WIPO at 
the time of this Comment’s writing.  For the additional working documents and 
revisions subsequent to the formal proposal, see WIPO, Proposal on an International 
Instrument on Limitations and Exceptions for Persons with Print Disabilities, Standing 
Comm. Copyright & Related Rights, 22d sess, June 15–24, 2011, WIPO Doc. 
SCCR/22/16 Prov. (June 23, 2011), available at http://www.ip-watch.org/ 
weblog/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SCCR-22-16-Prov.-June-2011.pdf; WIPO, 
Working Document on an International Instrument on Limitations and Exceptions for 
Persons with Print Disabilities, Standing Comm. Copyright & Related Rights, 23d 
sess, Nov. 21–25, Nov. 28, Nov. 29, & Dec. 2, 2011, WIPO Doc. SCCR/23/7 Prov. 
(Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/Working_ 
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developing countries’ more restrained proposals—evoke traces of 
policies reminiscent of A2K and the WIPO Development Agenda. 
4.2. Initial Developing Country Proposals 
4.2.1. Latin American VIP Treaty: Setting an Initial Negotiation 
Baseline 
The Latin American VIP Treaty76 requires satisfaction of the 
following elements to render a copyrighted work into an accessible 
format for importation or exportation between WIPO signatories:77  
(1) the initial copy of the work must be obtained lawfully; (2) the 
work may only be rendered into “an accessible format”; (3) the 
accessible written work may only be “supplied exclusively” to 
VIPs; and (4) the accessible written work may only be undertaken 
“on a non-profit basis.”78  Perhaps recognizing its potential 
incompatibility with copyright systems grounded in moral rights, 
the treaty attempts to provide for their acknowledgment.79 
 
document_VIP_Final_Prov[1].doc.  Undoubtedly, unless treaty talks stall, 
additional proposals may arise after this Comment’s publication. 
76 Note that despite referring to the proposal broadly as the “Latin American 
VIP Treaty,” the only countries named on the proposal were Brazil, Ecuador, and 
Paraguay.  Admittedly, a small selection of only three countries is not necessarily 
representative of every country in the entire geographic region.  Therefore, 
despite the broad language throughout this Comment, this Comment should not 
be construed to purport that the proposal is representative of all Latin American 
countries. 
77 See Latin American VIP Treaty, supra note 69, Annex, art. 8. 
78 See id., Annex, art. 4(a)(1)–(4).  An optional exception to the fourth element 
provides that countries may allow for-profit entities to distribute written works 
under the following conditions: (1) the activity “fall[s] within the normal 
exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights,” (2) the activity is only undertaken 
on “a non-profit basis, only to extend access to works to [VIPs] on an equal basis 
with others,” and (3) accessible copies of the work are not “reasonably available” 
and the entity provides notice and adequate compensation to the lawful copyright 
holder.  Id., Annex, art. 4 (c)(1)–(3).  However, the treaty allows a country to waive 
the third element of the for-profit exception.  Id., Annex, art. 19 (“Any Contracting 
Parties may declare that it [sic] declines to implement Article 4(c)(3) of the 
Treaty.”). 
79 See id., Annex, art. 5(a) (“Where a work . . . is supplied to a [VIP under the 
treaty], mention shall be made of the source, and of the name of the author as it 
appears on the work or copy of the work that the person or organization acting 
under Article 4 has lawful access to.”).  The Latin American proposal further 
stresses: “Use as permitted by Article 4 shall be without prejudice to the exercise 
of moral rights.”  Id., Annex, art. 5(b).  Furthermore, under the for-profit exception 
of the proposal, “reasonable efforts should be made to provide notice to the owner 
of a work protected by copyright.”  Also under the for-profit exception, authors 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss4/4
04 WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  3:28 PM 
2012] MOVEMENT TOWARDS A COPYRIGHT TREATY 1053 
Besides the Latin American VIP Treaty’s basic elements, it 
promulgates a rather inclusive definition of VIPs:  “persons with 
any . . . disability who, due to that disability, need an accessible 
format . . . in order to access a copyright work to substantially the 
same degree as a person without a disability.”80  Somewhat 
controversially, this broad language may seemingly extend the 
scope of the treaty beyond VIPs.  Also, somewhat contentiously, 
the treaty stipulates that its provisions automatically comply with 
existing international copyright law.81 
While the Latin American VIP treaty targets copyright issues 
afflicting VIPs, broader statements in the treaty stand to effectuate 
the goals of A2K and the WIPO Development Agenda.  Most 
obviously, the treaty directly emphasizes that negotiation of a VIP 
Treaty stands to enhance implementation of the WIPO 
Development Agenda.82  It further pronounces that the treaty must 
be “development-oriented” and should account for developmental 
disparities.83  Moreover, the preamble champions quintessential 
A2K objectives:  “to provide full and equal access to information and 
communication for the visually impaired.”84  Consistent with IP 
reform movements, the treaty also invokes a broad desire to 
institute more flexible and accommodating copyright laws to 
address societal concerns: 
The Purpose of this Treaty is to provide the necessary 
minimum flexibilities in copyright laws that are needed to 
ensure full and equal access to information and 
communication for persons who are visually impaired or 
 
must receive reasonable compensation.  Id., Annex, art. 11.  However, in 
developing countries, “remuneration should also take into consideration the need 
to ensure that works are accessible and available at prices that are affordable.”  Id. 
80 Id., Annex, art. 15(b). 
81 See id., Annex, art. 3 (“Contracting Parties agree that the provisions of this 
Treaty are consistent with obligations set out under those of the following treaties 
and conventions to which they are a party . . . .”). 
82 Latin American VIP Treaty, supra note 69, Annex, at 1 [¶ 3] (“[T]he 
establishment of formal negotiations on limitations and exceptions would 
contribute to the broader aims of the Development Agenda, particularly the ones 
related to norm-setting . . . .”). 
83 Id., Annex, art. 2(e) (“Implementation of the Treaty shall be development-
oriented and transparent, taking into account the priorities and the special needs 
of developing countries, as well as the different levels of development of 
Contracting Parties.”) (citing the WIPO Development Agenda). 
84 Id. (emphasis added). 
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otherwise disabled in terms of reading copyrighted works, 
focusing in particular on measures that are needed to 
publish and distribute works in formats that are accessible 
for persons who are blind, have low vision, or have other 
disabilities in reading text, in order to support their full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with 
others, and to ensure the opportunity to develop and utilize 
their creative, artistic and intellectual potential, not only for 
their own benefit, but also for the enrichment of society.85 
Therefore, through such statements, the Latin American VIP Treaty 
offers a valuable foundational starting point for enhancing A2K 
and the WIPO Development Agenda upon which the ensuing 
treaties would build. 
4.2.2. African VIP Treaty: Pushing the Boundaries of IP Reform 
More Directly Beyond Visually Impaired Persons 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the African group proposed the most 
expansive VIP Treaty.  The treaty’s title itself telegraphs its broad 
scope well beyond VIPs:  “Draft WIPO Treaty on Exceptions and 
Limitations for the Disabled, Educational and Research 
Institutions, Libraries and Archive Centers.”86  While the elements 
for an exception under the African treaty are roughly analogous to 
the Latin American proposal,87 the African proposal sets forth the 
most expansive definition of VIPs.88  Indeed, read at its broadest, 
the definition may conceivably extend to those possessing the 
“disability” of illiteracy.  Likewise, the treaty is the only one to 
overtly propose copyright exceptions beyond VIPs.89  Moreover, the 
treaty authorizes circumvention of “technical protection measures” 
 
85 Id.,Annex, art. 3. 
86 African VIP Treaty, supra note 70. 
87 See id. art. 5 (detailing the VIP copyright exception’s elements under the 
African VIP treaty). 
88 See id. art. 21 (stating that the treaty extends to VIPs and “persons with any 
other disability who, due to that disability, need an accessible format of a type 
that could be made . . . in order to access a copyright work to substantially the 
same degree as a person without a disability”). 
89 The exceptions include: (1) private use and research, (2) educational and 
research institutions, (3) libraries and archives, (4) computer programs, (5) certain 
instances of visual and sound performances, and (6) quotation.  Id. arts. 6–10. 
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by those covered under the copyright exception90 and expressly 
prohibits contracting around its provisions.91  It also adopts the 
Latin American Treaty’s provision stipulating that the VIP treaty 
automatically comports with international copyright agreements.92  
Lastly, the treaty broadly permits countries to take any additional 
measures “necessary to achieve greater equality of access to 
knowledge and communications.”93 
As with the Latin American proposal, the African VIP treaty 
provides strong support to IP reform movements.  Consistent with 
the WIPO Development Agenda, the African treaty asserts a firm 
stance on stimulating development.94  It highlights “the importance 
of guaranteeing that developing countries enjoy and continue to 
enjoy access to flexibilities and exceptions without any legal or 
technical hindrances.”95  Moreover, the proposal invokes quite 
broad principles of human rights and equality.96  More remarkably, 
the African group’s proposal is the only one to explicitly endorse 
 
90 Id. art. 13 (declaring that the beneficiaries of the treaty should “have the 
means to enjoy the exception where technical protection measures have been 
applied to the work”). 
91 Id. art. 13 (“[A]ny contractual provisions which provide exemptions from 
the application of the limitations and exceptions listed in Article 2 shall be null 
and void.”). 
92 Id. art. 4. 
93 Id. art. 23(3). 
94 See id. pmbl. (asserting that the proposed treaty is “[p]rompted by a desire 
to contribute to implementation of the relevant recommendations of the [WIPO] 
Development Agenda”) 
95 Id. (emphasis added). 
96 The preamble declares: 
Recalling the principles of non-discrimination, equal opportunity and 
access, proclaimed in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities; 
Noting that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
guarantees the right to freedom of expression, including freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art or through 
any other media of his choice; 
Considering that equal access to education, culture, information and 
communication is a fundamental right that comes under public policy; 
Recognizing the important role played by the authorities in guaranteeing 
equal opportunity for all in terms of access to education, culture and 
information. 
Id. 
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broadening the “scope of copyright exceptions and limitations.”97  
Presumably, such broadening would facilitate greater social 
equality amongst not just VIPs, but many other groups as well.98  
Thus, the African VIP Treaty clearly offers the broadest approach, 
one that champions broad access and developmental objectives 
that expressly extend beyond the specific needs of VIPs. 
4.3. Initial Developed Country Proposals 
4.3.1. Initial European Union VIP Treaty: Providing a More 
Restrained Approach 
Somewhat predictably, the EU’s 2010 proposal offers a more 
restrained VIP treaty than those proposed by the developing 
countries.  Indeed, the treaty never expressly endorses utilizing IP 
law flexibilities to better accommodate developing countries.99  
Instead, the treaty narrows its focus explicitly to VIPs.100  
Furthermore, the treaty explicitly mandates that the copyright 
exception “may only be applied in certain special cases which do 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
rightholder.”101  Additionally, the EU proposes a narrower 
definition of VIPs than the developing countries’ broader 
definitions.102  In recognition of Europe’s moral rights tradition, the 
treaty authorizes countries to mandate compensation to copyright 
holders for all distribution of accessible written works.103 
 
97 Id. 
98 Id. (seeking a broadening of copyright limitations and exceptions not just 
for “disabled persons,” but also for “libraries, archives, education and research”). 
99 See generally id. 
100 The preface of the EU VIP Treaty perhaps most starkly demonstrates this 
dynamic.  It repeatedly makes reference solely to making concessions to VIPs, but 
eschews any broader language that would be likely to be construed beyond VIPs.  
Compare id., Preface (making no reference to greater developmental needs), with 
Latin American VIP Treaty, supra note 69, Annex, art. 2(e) (stating that the treaty 
“shall be development-oriented” per the WIPO Development Agenda). 
101 Id.  This language mirrors the language of the Berne three-step test.  See 
supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing and articulating the Berne three-
step test). 
102 See EU VIP Treaty, supra note 71, art. 1(ii) (defining VIPs as those with 
seeing disabilities, dyslexia or those physically unable to manipulate traditional 
printed works). 
103 See id. art. 2 (“Member states may ensure that the rights holders receive an 
adequate remuneration for the use of their works covered by the exception.”).  
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The EU proposal also attaches an additional hurdle that is 
wholly absent in the developing countries’ proposals104—
dissemination of accessible written works may only occur through 
a “trusted intermediary.”105  A trusted intermediary is “an 
approved institution whose activities must have the consent of 
both[] persons with a print disability and rights holders such as 
publishers” who facilitate cross-border transfer of accessible 
written works “in a controlled manner.”106  The trusted 
intermediary requirement may prejudice those developing 
countries that lack sufficient resources to establish viable trusted 
intermediaries.  Moreover, because trusted intermediaries must be 
approved by rights holders under the 2010 EU proposal, some 
rights holders may put up significant fights in approving them. 
Also notably, the EU proposal prohibits the copyright 
exception where “there are sufficient and adequate market 
solutions for persons with a print disability.”107  Additionally, the 
treaty refuses to stipulate to per se compliance with existing 
copyright treaties as the developing countries propose.108 
While the EU treaty provides a more restrained approach, it 
still embraces at least minimal traces of A2K and the WIPO 
Development Agenda.  For example, it acknowledges “the 
importance of accessibility to the achievement of equal 
opportunities in all spheres of society.”109  Moreover, it further 
encourages “the balance of the international system of intellectual 
 
The Latin American VIP treaty only requires compensation to copyright holders 
when an entity distributes accessible written works on a for-profit basis.  See supra 
note 78 and accompanying text. 
104 This requirement is also present in the U.S. proposal.  See U.S. VIP Treaty, 
supra note 72, art. 1(3). 
105 See EU VIP Treaty, supra note 71, art. 4 (stating that cross-border transfer 
of “physical works in accessible formats” must be done through “a trusted 
intermediary”). 
106 Id. art. 1(iv).  The EU VIP Treaty requires that trusted intermediaries must: 
(1) operate on a non-profit basis, (2) register those with print disabilities “they 
serve,” (3) provide “specialized services relating to training, education or adaptive 
reading . . . needs of [VIPs],” (3) “maintain policies and procedures to establish the 
bona fide nature of persons with print disabilities that they serve,” and (4) 
“maintain policies and procedures to ensure full and complete compliance with 
copyright and data protection law.”  Id. 
107 Id. art. 2.  The proposal provides no definition, however, of what 
constitutes a sufficient market solution. 
108 On the contrary, the treaty emphasizes “[t]aking into account the Berne 
Convention and World Copyright Treaty.”  Id., Preface. 
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property.”110  Admittedly, such language provides more superficial 
and indirect endorsement of the IP reform movements.  Indeed, it 
certainly does not outright endorse the WIPO Development 
Agenda.  However, the aforementioned statements do at least 
guardedly acknowledge principles that underlie A2K and the 
Development Agenda.  Therefore, inasmuch as the treaty 
engenders such principles, even the EU’s restrained approach 
stands to advance the IP reform movements at least to a certain 
degree. 
4.3.2. Initial United States VIP Treaty: An Additional Restrained 
Approach 
The 2010 U.S. VIP Treaty proposes a similarly restrained 
approach.  For example, the United States proposes the narrowest 
definitions for both VIPs111 and permissible accessible formats.112  
The Treaty also requires distribution of most accessible written 
works via trusted intermediaries.113  Additionally, the U.S. VIP 
Treaty declines to incorporate any express stipulation of the 
 
109 Id. 
110 Id. (emphasis added).  However, such balance must still remain within the 
confines of the Berne Convention.  Id. 
111 The treaty defines VIPs as: (1) the visually impaired and (2) individuals 
incapable of physically manipulating traditional print materials.  Compare U.S. VIP 
Treaty, supra note 72, art. 1 (defining VIPs as those who are blind, those who 
possess a visual impairment that restricts ability “to read printed works to 
substantially the same degree as a person without an impairment,” or those with a 
physical disability that prevents manipulation and use of traditional print 
materials), with EU VIP Treaty, supra note 71, art. 1 (allowing, in addition to the 
conditions covered in the U.S. definition, those who are dyslexic). 
112 The treaty allows for conversion distribution of protected works that are 
converted into Braille, audio, or digital text formats for VIPs.  U.S. VIP Treaty, 
supra note 72, art. 1. 
113 Id. arts. 2(A), 3(B) (allowing for import and export of “special format” 
works only through trusted intermediaries).  The U.S. VIP Treaty restricts “special 
format” works to “Braille, audio, or digital text which is exclusively for use by 
persons with print disabilities.”  The treaty defines trusted intermediaries as 
follows: “[A] government agency or non-profit entity . . . that has as a primary 
mission to assist [VIPs] by providing them with services relating to education, 
training, adaptive reading, or information access.”  Id. art. 1.  The treaty further 
requires that trusted intermediaries be approved both by VIPs and by copyright 
holders.  Id.  However, the treaty does not require distribution of Braille works via 
trusted intermediaries.  Id. arts. 2(A), 3(B) (allowing importation and exportation 
of any “physical Braille format copy of a published work” without requiring a 
trusted intermediary). 
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treaty’s compliance with international copyright law.114  To the 
contrary, it largely stresses maintaining the Berne Convention’s 
framework.115  Moreover, it also lacks overt language in support of 
the WIPO Development Agenda.116 
Nonetheless, as with the EU VIP Treaty, the U.S. proposal still 
conjures subtle traces of A2K and developmental principles.  It 
acknowledges “the public interest in maintaining a balance between 
the interests of authors and users, particularly the needs of those 
persons with print disabilities or impairment of their vision . . . .”117  
Furthermore, it recognizes “the role of the copyright system in 
facilitating access to information and full engagement by persons 
who are blind or print disabled in civil, educational, political, 
economic, social and cultural spheres . . . .”118  Such emphasis on IP 
balance is certainly embraced within both the WIPO Development 
Agenda and A2K.  Similarly, recognition of copyright “facilitating 
access to information” directly comports with A2K.  Nonetheless, 
the United States couches these statements within the narrow 
scope of VIPs only.  Even with this limitation, however, evocation 
of such language stands to enhance the IP reform movements. 
4.4. 2011 VIP Proposal: Consolidated Proposal of Latin America, the 
United States, the European Union, and other Delegations 
By mid-2011, VIP treaty negotiations progressed,119 leading to a 
new treaty proposal that seeks to strike a compromise between the 
 
114 See generally U.S. VIP Treaty, supra note 72 (containing no provision 
agreeing to per se compliance with international IP treaties).  In fact, it is the only 
proposal to explicitly invoke the Berne three-step test by name.  Id. at 2 [pmbl., 
para. 7] (“Emphasizing the importance, vitality and flexibility of the three-step 
test for limitations and exceptions established in Article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention and in Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty.”).  As previously 
noted, however, the EU’s 2010 proposal nonetheless does invoke language that is 
essentially identical to the three-step test.  See discussion supra note 101.  The 
developing country proposals, on the other hand, lack such invocation of the 
three-step test. 
115 See U.S. VIP Treaty, supra note 72, at 2 [pmbl., para. 2] (stating that the 
treaty will take “into account the provisions of the Berne Convention”). 
116 See generally U.S. VIP Treaty, supra note 72. 
117 Id. at 2 [pmbl., para. 4] (emphasis added). 
118 Id. [pmbl., para. 5]. 
119 See Catherine Saez, Common Text Emerges on Copyright Exceptions for the 
Blind, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 17, 2011, 5:29 PM), http://www.ipwatch.org/ 
weblog/2011/06/17/common-text-emerges-on-copyright-exceptions-for-the-
blind/ (noting that, according to a U.S. SCCR delegate, the 2011 negotiations 
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prior proposals.120  The basic recommended elements for a 
copyright exception under the 2011 proposal do not diverge 
dramatically from those articulated in the first Latin American 
proposal.  Indeed, the treaty suggests that authorized entities must 
(1) initially have “lawful access” to the copyrighted work, (2) 
convert the work to an accessible format which “does not 
introduce changes other than those needed to make the work 
accessible to the beneficiary person,” (3) supply the accessible 
works exclusively to VIPs, and (4) generally undertake the 
distribution on a non-profit basis.121  A closer reading of the 
proposal, however, indicates that these elements are merely 
illustrative recommendations rather than mandatory.  Indeed, the 
2011 treaty offers a great deal of leeway by essentially offering 
countries the following three broad choices:  (1) provide for any 
VIP exception to the rights for reproduction, distribution, and 
making available to the public as defined in Article 8 of the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty;122 (2) adopt the abovementioned illustrative 
four-part test;123 or (3) provide any other VIP exception which 
would comply with the Berne three-step test.124 
 
reflected a “‘careful compromise between’ several countries and is based on 
‘good-faith discussions’”). 
120 The treaty was proposed by Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, the European Union, Mexico, Norway, Paraguay, Russia, the United 
States, and Uruguay.  See 2011 Combined VIP Treaty, supra note 75, at 1.  The 
African Group, however, did not join the proposal.  Rather, it proposed a far 
broader treaty similar to that of its prior proposal.  See generally WIPO, Draft 
WIPO Treaty on Exceptions and Limitations for the Persons with Disabilities, 
Educational and Research Institutions, Libraries and Archives, Proposal by the African 
Group, Standing Comm. Copyright & Related Rights, 22d sess, June 15–24, 2011, 
WIPO Doc. SCCR/22/12 (June 3, 2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ 
mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_22/sccr_22_12.pdf. 
121 2011 Combined VIP Treaty Proposal, supra note 75, art. C(2)(A). 
122 Id. art. C(1).  Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty provides that 
authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of au-
thorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or 
wireless means, including the making available of their works in such a 
way that members of the public may access these works from a place at a 
time individually chosen by them. 
WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 8, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65. 
123 2011 Combined VIP Treaty Proposal, supra note 75, art. C(2)(A). 
124 Id. art. C(3) (“A member state/Contracting Party may fulfill Article C (1) 
by providing any other exception or limitation in its national copyright law that is 
limited to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right 
holder.”).  While not overtly referring to the three-step test by name, this 
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Besides the general elements outlined above, many of the more 
restrained features pushed for by the developed countries appear 
to have prevailed in the latest VIP treaty incarnation.  For example, 
the 2011 proposal is framed as non-binding rather than binding,125 
and it sets forth a rather narrow definition of VIPs.126  Moreover, it 
retains reference to the developed countries’ use of trusted 
intermediaries (now referred to as “authorized entities”).127  
Additionally, the 2011 proposal explicitly refuses to bar contracting 
around the treaty as the developing countries originally sought in 
their initial proposals,128 and the proposal allows countries to limit 
VIP exceptions “to published works which, in the applicable 
special format, cannot be otherwise obtained within a reasonable 
time and at a reasonable price.”129  Lastly, the 2011 proposal allows 
countries to require remuneration for accessible works distributed 
under the treaty.130 
 
exception essentially employs the exact language of the three-step test.  For an 
articulation of the three-step test, see supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
125 The 2011 proposal states that a “Member State/Contracting Party 
should/shall provide in their national copyright law for an exception or limitation 
[for VIPs].”  Id. art. C (emphasis added). 
126 Compare 2011 Combined VIP Treaty Proposal, supra note 75, art. B 
(restricting qualifying VIPs to the blind, those who cannot use corrective lenses to 
read, and those physically unable to manipulate traditional print formats), with 
VIP definitions discussed supra Sections 4.2–4.3 (providing more expansive 
definitions in the developing country proposals and the EU proposal). 
127 See 2011 Combined VIP Treaty Proposal, supra note 75, arts. A, C(2)(A) 
(suggesting that dissemination of written works in accessible formats be 
distributed through authorized entities).  The 2011 proposal defines authorized 
entities as “a governmental agency, a non-profit entity or non-profit organization 
that has one of its primary missions to assist persons with print disabilities by 
providing them with services relating to education, training adaptive reading, or 
information access.”  Id. art. A.  However, the authorized entity requirement is 
somewhat softened from the trusted intermediary requirement of the prior 
developed country proposals because it does not require “the prior permission of . 
. . rightholders or beneficiary persons.”  Id. 
128 See id. art. G (“[N]othing herein shall prevent Member States/Contracting 
Parties from addressing the relationship of contract law and statutory exceptions 
and limitations for beneficiary persons.”). 
129 Id. art. C(4).  However, the treaty does provide some level of 
accommodation to developing countries by providing different definitions of 
“reasonable price” depending upon whether a country is developed or 
developing.  See id. art. A (stating that determination of the reasonable price in 
developing countries should “tak[e] into account the humanitarian needs of 
persons with print disabilities”). 
130 Id. art. C(5). 
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Despite these somewhat more restrained features, the 2011 
proposal does, nonetheless, evoke rather firm endorsements of 
A2K and the WIPO Development Agenda.  For instance, the treaty 
highlights that the majority of VIPs live in lower income 
countries.131  Hence, in this vein, it explicitly acknowledges the 
need to effectuate the WIPO Development Agenda.132  Similarly, 
with respect to A2K, the treaty strongly acknowledges the need for 
copyright law to balance between rights holders and the greater 
public interest.133  Indeed, while reaffirming copyright’s roles in 
incentivizing creation, the treaty further stresses the need to 
balance incentives with meaningful participation in cultural and 
scientific advancement.134  Thus, notwithstanding disagreement 
from the African Group,135 the 2011 proposal ultimately appears to 
be a step forward towards meaningful reconciliation between the 
interests of developed and developing countries, a reconciliation 
 
131 Id. pmbl., para. 6 (“[T]he majority of visually impaired persons/persons 
with a print disability live in countries of low or moderate incomes.”). 
132 Id. (declaring that the treaty was “[p]rompted by a desire to contribute to 
the implementation of the relevant recommendations of the Development Agenda 
of the World Intellectual Property Organization”).  As previously discussed, prior 
developed country proposals never explicitly endorsed assisting implementation 
of the WIPO Development Agenda.  See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
133 See 2011 Combined VIP Treaty Proposal, supra note 75, pmbl., para. 13 
(recognizing existence of a “need to maintain a balance between the rights of 
authors and the larger public interest, particularly education, research and access 
to information, and that such a balance must facilitate effective and timely access 
to works for the benefit of visually impaired persons/persons with a print 
disability”).  Note that, somewhat akin to prior developed country proposals, the 
latter half of the statement hones in strictly on VIPs, perhaps in a move to prevent 
the treaty from extending beyond VIPs.  However, the first half of the clause still 
appears to endorse a broader balancing of the public interest generally.  This 
dynamic appears to aptly demonstrate the nature of the 2011 proposal as a 
compromise between prior developed and developing country proposals. 
134 Id. pmbl., para. 3 (acknowledging the need for copyright law to 
incentivize creation but similarly stressing that it should “enhanc[e] opportunities 
for everyone to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts 
and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits”). 
135 As noted above, the African Group has yet to endorse the latest proposal.  
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.  Reportedly, the African Group’s 
concerns included that the 2011 proposal “did not reflect the positions of all 
member states” and that any VIP Agreement must be a binding treaty rather than 
a non-binding instrument.  See Catherine Saez, WIPO Members Advance Draft Texts 
on Copyright Exceptions, AV Protection, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 23, 2011, 9:39 
PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/06/23/wipo-members-advance-
draft-texts-on-copyright-exceptions-av-protection. 
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that, in its current form, firmly endorses the tenets embraced by 
A2K and the WIPO Development Agenda. 
5. OPPOSITION TO A VIP TREATY 
Certain actors have objected to adopting a VIP treaty.136  
Predictably, a large contingent of the criticism derives from 
influential interest groups representing copyright holders that 
would be weary of undermining any existing IP protection.137  
Interestingly though, some criticism derives from rights holders 
who do not even possess a direct stake in written works.138  Most 
likely, the underlying—and perhaps unspoken—motive driving 
these rights holders’ opposition is a concern that permitting any 
erosion of copyright’s exclusion rights will catalyze further 
exceptions in other areas, and therefore threaten to undermine 
existing exclusion rights in other realms pertinent to their own 
respective industries.139  Ultimately, much of the criticism lodged 
against a VIP treaty largely brushes aside whether existing 
copyright law embodies a properly balanced IP system.  Therefore, 
with this consideration in mind, the ensuing material responds to 
some of the critics’ arguments. 
 
136 It should be noted at the outset of this Section that many of the criticisms 
sampled in the ensuing text directly responded to the initial Latin American treaty 
proposal, which was initially the only proposal tabled before WIPO.  Nonetheless, 
many of the critiques lodged against the Latin American proposal might very 
likely be lodged against almost any VIP treaty. 
137 Some of the leading critics include the Association of American 
Publishers; Independent Film and Television Alliance; Motion Picture Association 
of America; National Music Publishers’ Association; and Recording Industry 
Association of America.  See Comment from Steven J. Metalitz, Partner, Mitchell 
Silberberg & Knupp LLP on behalf of copyright industry organizations, to Maria 
Pallante, Assoc. Register, Policy & Int’l Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office, regarding 
Notice of Inquiry and Request for Comments on the Topic of Facilitating Access to 
Copyrighted Works for the Blind or Other Persons With Disabilities, 74 Fed. Reg. 
52507, at 5 (Nov. 13, 2009) [hereinafter AAP et al., Comment], available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sccr/comments/2009/comments-2/steven-j-
metalitz-aap-ifta-mpaa-nmpa-riaa.pdf (raising the concern that the treaty “departs 
sharply from well-grounded precedents against mandating exceptions to 
copyright protection”). 
138 Notable examples include the film lobby and music industry lobby.  See 
supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
139 Indeed, some rights holders have explicitly argued that a VIP treaty will 
create a dangerous slippery slope.  See infra Section 5.1.  Others, however, have 
more subtly relied upon other arguments to oppose a VIP treaty, even where they 
likely have an unspoken interest in preventing any trend towards softening of 
copyright protections generally. 
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5.1. Perception that a VIP Treaty Will Produce a Slippery Slope of 
Continual Undermining of IP Rights 
Certain critics contend that a VIP treaty will open a Pandora’s 
Box of limitless additional copyright exceptions beyond VIPs.  A 
contingent of leading copyright-holding lobbying groups 
consisting of book publishers, film companies, and the music 
industry has expressed this reservation: 
[T]here is a serious risk that the likely impact of the draft 
treaty will not be confined to the four corners of the [VIP 
Treaty], widely spaced though they be.  Viewed in context, 
the draft appears to many as the not-so-thin edge of a 
wedge to be driven into the long-standing structure of 
global copyright norms.  It advocates a U-turn in the 
approach to global copyright norms that would almost 
certainly not be restricted to the issue of access for the 
visually impaired, or even for the disabled community 
generally.  Adoption of this proposal would be used to 
justify a radical approach—mandating in national law 
exceptions and limitations that reach far beyond what 
would be even permissible under global norms today—in 
many other fields of copyright law.140 
Consequently, the group argues, a VIP treaty will create far more 
than “a small rip in the encompassing fabric of global copyright 
law.”141 
This critique overstates and sensationalizes the degree of 
disorder that a VIP treaty will exert on IP law.  Moreover, it 
assumes that the existing IP framework already provides an 
optimal balance of IP rights.  However, A2K and the WIPO 
Development Agenda question this fundamental assumption.142  
Assuming copyright law should operate to enrich the public by 
incentivizing development of creative works for public 
consumption,143 the dearth of accessible written works 
 
140 AAP et al., Comment, supra note 137, at 5. 
141 Id. 
142 See Vera Franz, Back to Balance: Limitations and Exceptions to Copyright, in 
ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 2, at 517, 
518 (noting that the rights of “users” have recently been overlooked in the 
balancing of intellectual property protection). 
143 See Kapczynski, supra note 2, at 27 (noting that the commonly held goal of 
providing exclusion rights via intellectual property law is to “generate markets in 
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demonstrates that VIPs cannot reap the benefit of public 
consumption under existing copyright law.  Therefore, arguing 
that a VIP treaty is inconsistent with copyright’s objectives proves 
illusory because VIPs do not even have an opportunity to access 
most written works as a properly aligned copyright framework 
should facilitate. 
Admittedly, critics are likely correct that a VIP treaty could 
mark a shift in copyright law.  However, a certain degree of 
realignment is to be welcomed rather than shunned where 
realignment establishes a more optimal balance of copyright:   
There are times in history when human and technological 
evolution require new approaches for balancing the scales 
of copyright protections and limitations.  The Berne 
Appendix and the other specific exceptions were 
introduced for this purpose.  It is once again time to focus 
on a just balance.  WIPO and the international copyright 
system it administers thrive on the idea of creativity and 
innovation that enable people and societies to evolve and 
achieve.  This is a time when reshaping the mold should be 
seen as essential to the integrity of nations and well-being 
of their citizens in all parts of the world.144 
A2K recognizes that such a shift in copyright law serves to 
enrich the existing framework.145  Moreover, embracing such a shift 
through a VIP treaty—whose beneficiaries reside overwhelmingly 
in developing countries—would help signal WIPO’s genuine 
commitment to meaningfully implementing the Development 
 
information, solving the free-rider problem and aligning individual incentives 
with social good”).  Certainly, some countries’ copyright laws are primarily based 
upon moral rights rather than incentive-based justifications.  It is perhaps less 
straightforward to justify a VIP treaty using utilitarian arguments for copyright 
systems based upon moral rights.  Nonetheless, should society receive a net 
benefit in information and cultural exchange, it may be beneficial to sacrifice a 
minimal erosion of moral rights within this particular exception.  Additionally, 
the minimal erosion of moral rights might be softened somewhat by recognition 
of authorial rights and other safeguards. 
144 Reply Comments of the Library Copyright Alliance, The Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, the Internet Archive, and the Chief Officers of State Library 
Agencies in the Matter of Facilitating Access to Copyrighted Works for the Blind 
or Other Persons with Disabilities 18 (Dec. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Library Copyright 
Alliance et al., Reply Comment], available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/ 
sccr/comments/2009/reply-2/23-gwen-hynze-and-janice-pilch.pdf. 
145 See supra Section 3.2 and accompanying text. 
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Agenda and upholding its developmental obligation as a U.N. 
body.  Such a shift does not tear away the very fabric of copyright 
law.  Rather, it merely seeks a healthier balancing of copyright 
law.146 
5.2. Concern that Certain VIP Treaty Terms are Overly Broad 
VIP treaty critics have asserted that terms in the VIP treaties—
particularly those proposed by developing countries—are “vastly 
overbroad.”147  The Motion Picture Association of America 
(“MPAA”), for instance, expressed concern that the Latin 
American VIP Treaty would apply “to all forms of visual 
impairment, not just to the blind” and therefore may cover 
dyslexia or other disorders.148  Worse, it speculated, a broad VIP 
definition might “allow unauthorized duplication and distribution 
of copyright works—even for commercial purposes—and the 
circumvention of technological protection measures can be 
invoked by any person who is self-defined as having any form of 
disability.”149  Seemingly brushing aside the developmental 
prospects of a VIP treaty, the MPAA has further objected that the 
Latin American proposal might even cover external causes “such 
as poverty or lack of access to technology.”150 
Admittedly, the developing countries’ treaties—especially the 
African treaty—utilize somewhat broad terms.  Indeed, the treaties 
 
146 Indeed, the Latin American Treaty Proposal specifically maintains the 
desire for copyright law to incentivize the creation of useful works, just within a 
more balanced framework that optimizes society’s ability to benefit from this 
stimulated creativity.  See Latin American VIP Treaty, supra note 69, Annex 
(“[T]he importance of copyright protection as an incentive for literary and artistic 
creation, and as a means to ensure that everyone has the opportunity to 
participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits.”).  Indeed, a similar dynamic appears 
within statements found in the 2011 proposal.  2011 Combined VIP Treaty, supra 
note 75, pmbl., para. 3 (“Emphasizing the importance of copyright protection as 
an incentive for literary and artistic creation and enhancing opportunities for 
everyone to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and 
to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.”). 
147 Fritz E. Attaway, Comments of Motion Picture Association of America 4 
(Nov. 13, 2009) [hereinafter MPAA Comment], available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sccr/comments/2009/comments-2/fritz-
attaway-mpaa.pdf. 
148 Id. at 8–9. 
149 Id. at 9.  See also AAP et al., Comment, supra note 137, at 5 (similarly 
disapproving of broad language in the definition of VIPs). 
150 Id. at 10. 
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utilize VIP definitions that potentially may be construed beyond 
certain individuals one would traditionally perceive purely as 
“visually impaired.” 
However, the MPAA’s apparent hesitation to accommodate 
those in poverty overlooks a VIP treaty’s ability to enhance WIPO’s 
commitment to the Development Agenda.  Indeed, the 
Development Agenda calls for WIPO’s legislative assistance to be 
“development-oriented . . . taking into account the priorities and 
the special needs of developing countries . . . .”151  Therefore, 
insofar as slightly broader treaty language would encourage 
development by benefitting impoverished individuals residing in 
developing countries, the WIPO Development Agenda would 
appear to lend credence to such language.  Moreover, even a 
developed country proposal—that of the EU—embraces a broader 
VIP definition.152  Thus, that even traditionally guarded, developed 
countries would provide such a broader definition provides 
additional support to rendering VIP definitions at least somewhat 
broader.  Of course, it would be undesirable to forge VIP 
definitions so broad as to render the treaty a means for nearly any 
individual to obtain free access to copyrighted works.  Therefore, 
whatever definition ultimately adopted optimally should strike a 
balance between encouraging development and access for VIPs, 
while not moving so far as to provide wholesale access to those 
who could otherwise ordinarily and conveniently disseminate 
written works in traditional formats. 
5.3. Belief that a VIP Copyright Treaty is Inappropriate Because It Will 
Not Increase VIPs’ Access to Written Works 
Other critics suggest that, even if copyright barriers were 
removed as to VIPs, VIPs’ use of accessible written works would 
not increase, because external deficiencies beyond copyright law 
provide the root cause for the scarcity of accessible written works.  
For example, the MPAA argued in its Comment under the heading 
“Copyright is Not an Impediment to access”:   
 
151 Development Agenda Recommendations, supra note 61, ¶ 13. 
152 In fact, the EU’s VIP definition even includes accommodation for those 
with dyslexia.  See EU VIP Treaty, supra note 71, art. 1(ii) (defining VIPs as those 
with seeing disabilities, dyslexia, or those physically unable to manipulate 
traditional printed works). 
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[T]he underlying cause of the issues purported to be 
addressed by the Treaty typically have nothing to do with 
copyright.  No international instrument mandating 
copyright limitations and exceptions will meaningfully 
contribute to increased access, because the assumption that 
existing copyright law is an impediment to access by the 
visually impaired or other disabled people is wholly 
inaccurate.  A gap in access certainly exists, but not one that 
an international legal instrument could hope to fill . . . . The 
focusing of attention and resources on an international 
instrument, at the expense of practical measures that would 
have a real world impact, stands to harm the interests of the 
visually impaired and other disabled people.153 
Similar arguments have been invoked by other lobbies, such as 
those of the software154 and book publishing155 industries. 
Undoubtedly, copyright law does not provide the sole 
impediment to VIPs’ access to written materials.  Conversion costs, 
infrastructure issues, and a multitude of other potential factors 
 
153 MPAA Comment, supra note 147, at 3 (first emphasis added). 
154 The Software and Information Industry Association remarked, 
Although copyright protection is a consideration affecting the ability of 
the blind and visually impaired from getting access to certain products 
and services, it is not the sole or primary factor. . . . [T]here are many 
considerations distinct from copyright protection that have a more 
substantial and direct effect on whether goods and services are made . . . 
accessible to the blind and visually impaired.  Focusing exclusively on 
copyright protection as a barrier to progress in this area is a mistake.  
And directing that focus on an international treaty is particularly unwise. 
Comments of Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n in Response to the Notice of the U.S. 
Copyright Office and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on October 13, 2009 
Requesting Comments on the Topic of Facilitating Access to Copyrighted Works 
for the Blind or Persons with Other Disabilities 2–3 (Nov. 13, 2009) [hereinafter 
SIIA Comment].  In this vein, the SIIA declared that the treaty would be “unlikely 
to improve greatly (or at all) the existing situation.”  Id. at 4. 
155 See Visually Impaired Persons (VIPs), INT’L PUBLISHERS ASS’N, 
http://www.internationalpublishers.org/index.php/-industry-policy/visually-
impaired-persons (last visited Apr. 11, 2011) (“Copyright exceptions, through 
their legal nature, do not address the key obstacles to access.  The biggest obstacle 
to wider accessibility are [sic] the costs for re-formatting works in VIP charities.  A 
reduction of these costs can only be reached through cooperation of rightsholders.  
A copyright exception is therefore not a suitable tool to achieve the shared 
objective.”)  Interestingly, the book publishing lobby calls merely for dependence 
upon “cooperation between publisher organisations and organisations 
representing VIPs,” an approach that thus far has failed to provide VIPs 
meaningful access to accessible written works.  Id. 
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likely contribute to the overall lack of availability.156  However, 
even the software industry qualifies its abovementioned critique 
on this point with an admission that copyright at least contributes to 
VIPs’ lack of access.157  Furthermore, a study submitted before 
WIPO suggests that removing copyright barriers may at least 
mitigate VIP’s access issues.158  Therefore, just because other factors 
exacerbate VIPs’ lack of access to accessible written works, it does 
not follow that a VIP treaty cannot play a meaningful role in 
mitigating the problem.  Indeed, a treaty at WIPO could play an 
integral role in a multifaceted approach to providing VIPs wider 
access to accessible written works: 
[C]opyright is not the only problem . . . . Any solution to the 
problem of accessibility must include changes in 
international copyright laws (legal solutions) as well as 
cooperation and collaboration of all interested parties 
(market solutions), and also continued development 
toward better applications and communications technology 
to enable accessibility (technological solutions).  The matter 
is too large, too critical, and too complex, for just one 
solution.  The treaty proposal leaves room for all 
solutions.159 
Hence, even though copyright law does not necessarily act as 
the sole barrier to VIPs’ ability to access accessible written works, a 
copyright exception stands to provide a valuable starting point to a 
multipronged approach.  An analogue to this issue can be drawn 
from the Access to Medicine Movement.  There, advocates argued 
 
156 For example, the American Foundation for the Blind estimates that a large 
volume Braille printer costs up to $80,000.  Braille Technology, AM. FOUND. FOR 
BLIND, http://www.afb.org/Section.asp?SectionID=4&TopicID=31&DocumentID 
=1282.  Thus, even if nonprofits could freely convert written works into accessible 
formats, it may be quite costly to do so regardless of copyright barriers.  
Moreover, there is not necessarily a sufficient market demand for publishers to 
produce most written works in accessible formats on the free market. 
157 SIAA Comment, supra note 154, at 2 (conceding that “copyright protection 
is a consideration affecting the ability of the blind and visually impaired from 
getting access to certain products and services”). 
158 WIPO Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for the Visually Impaired, 
supra note 7, at 133 (“Exceptions to copyright are never likely to deliver full 
accessibility to all publications of the written word for visually impaired people, 
but they may nevertheless be justified until much more material is published in 
accessible forms.”). 
159 Library Copyright Alliance et al., Reply Comment, supra note 144, at 13. 
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that patent law restrictions prevented developing countries from 
obtaining AIDS medication.160  While a blanket treaty analogous to 
a VIP treaty was never formed,161 a multipronged approach that 
included realignment of approaches to patent law led to greater 
access to AIDS medication in developing countries.162  While the 
instant VIP treaty does not provide an exact equivalent to Access to 
Medicine, similarly realigning copyright laws regarding VIPs in 
concert with other efforts may engender positive movement 
towards improving VIPs’ access to accessible works.  Hence, even 
if a VIP treaty does not provide the sole solution to VIPs’ access 
problems, it stands to provide a meaningful step in the right 
direction worth pursuing. 
5.4. Assertion that a VIP Treaty Will Disincentivize Creation of 
Creative Works 
Some treaty opponents have argued that a VIP treaty will 
undermine rights holders’ incentive to create and will therefore 
result in fewer written works.  Without offering analogous 
empirical evidence, the MPAA has asserted this very argument:  
“[T]o the extent that the proposed Treaty would mandate gaping 
fissures in the current level of copyright productions with 
potentially devastating impact to create new works, society as a 
whole would be left with fewer works to access.”163  In less pointed 
terms, Microsoft has expressed similar reservations:  “The reticence 
of authors’ and publishers’ [sic] to license this activity is caused in 
 
160 See Susan K. Sell, A Comparison of A2K Movements: From Medicines to 
Farmers, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra 
note 2, at 391, 394–97 (describing the Access to Medicine Movement, which 
targeted reducing high pharmaceutical prices in developing countries by calling 
for patent law flexibilities); see also Kapczynski, supra note 2, at 37–39 (describing 
the Access to Medicine campaign’s attempt to reduce AIDS medication prices in 
developing countries, which were artificially high due to pharmaceutical 
companies’ patent protections).  
161 Despite the lack of a comprehensive treaty on Access to Medicine, TRIPS 
was nonetheless amended to allow easier access to generic medications in certain 
cases.  See Sell, supra note 160, at 396–97 (detailing the TRIPS amendments 
pertaining to generic medications). 
162 See id.; see also Kapczynski, supra note 33, at 828 (noting that “perhaps the 
most significant measure of the success of the campaign has been the drastic fall 
in the price” of relevant medicine). 
163 MPAA Comment, supra note 147, at 3. 
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part by fears that it may . . . undermine the economic incentive for 
the creation and distribution of books.”164 
The notion that a VIP treaty will stifle incentives seems far less 
likely than critics suggest.  As a starting point, varying copyright 
exceptions for visually impaired persons already exist in at least 
fifty-seven countries, and no reports appear to have surfaced 
claiming a disincentive effect on works in such countries.165 
Indeed, continued existence of a viable market for written 
works in traditional text-based formats should maintain adequate 
incentive for creators to continue creating.  While critics may 
believe that free dissemination of accessible written works will cut 
into the market for traditional text formats, works in accessible 
formats cannot fully duplicate the value and intrinsic pleasure that 
a typical reader derives from traditional print.166  Consequently, 
 
164 Comment by Laura Ruby, Director, Accessibility Policy & Standards, 
Microsoft Corp. and Jule Sigall, Senior Copyright Counsel, Microsoft Corp., to 
Maria Pallante, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int’l Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office, 
regarding Notice of Inquiry and Request for Comments on the Topic of 
Facilitating Access to Copyrighted Works for the Blind or Other Persons with 
Disabilities 4 (Nov. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Microsoft Comment], available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sccr/comments/2009/comments-2/jule-sigall-
microsoft-corporation.pdf. 
165 WIPO Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for the Visually Impaired, 
supra note 7, § 2.1 (providing data on VIP copyright exceptions in fifty-seven 
countries).  
166 See, e.g., Tim Challies, 5 Reasons Books are Better than E-Books, CHALLIES.COM 
(Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.challies.com/articles/5-reasons-books-are-better-
than-e-books (“[A] book is unique—there is nothing else quite like it.  An e-book 
reduces a book to just its words, it strips out any sort of tactile experience. . . . It 
makes a book a whole lot less than it ought to be.”); Anne Mangen, Hypertext 
Fiction Reading: Haptics and Immersion, 31 J. RES. READING 404, 406–07 (2008) (noting 
that digital text formats, for instance, do not as readily induce readers to fully 
immerse themselves in literature and obtain enjoyment from the imagination that 
occurs in traditional print formats); Listening Isn’t Reading—Why Braille is Still 
Necessary, OPEN SALON, BIBLIO FILES BLOG, http://open.salon.com/blog/the_ 
biblio_files/2010/02/02/listening_isnt_reading_--_why_braille_is_still_necessary 
(Feb 2, 2010, 11:05 PM) (“It’s undoubtedly a different experience to read a book 
with just ink and paper (or pixels and screen) between you and the author than it 
is to listen to someone’s vocalization of the sentences.”).  This argument does not 
suppose per se that alternative forms of text-based works such as e-books do not 
present viable markets.  Conversion to other formats such as Braille, however, 
may result in certain losses of authorial expression much like a translated work 
would.  Other formats, such as audiobooks, force particular inflections, govern 
pace, and other modifications which may be less preferable than a reader’s own 
internal narrative voice and therefore may decrease the pleasure readers derive 
from traditional reading.  See, e.g., Why Are Books Always Better Than the Movie 
Versions?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/why-are-books-always-better-
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even if it were possible for non-VIPs to improperly use accessible 
written works made under the treaty, most non-VIPs would still 
likely opt to purchase a written work in a format inaccessible to 
VIPs. 
Even more convincingly, rights holders already derive scant 
profit from accessible written works.167  Indeed, if a vital market 
existed for accessible written works, their scarcity would not likely 
be so pronounced.  Therefore, because rights holders largely draw 
their profits from non-accessible works, providing VIPs free access 
to works in formats that publishers are not drawing profits from 
anyways could not substantially reduce incentives to create.  
However, even if assuming arguendo that incentives were 
modestly reduced, a slight reduction in incentives might be 
welcome if it would be offset by a more significant gain in access to 
information.168  Here, the disincentive effect on creation appears 
slight at best, while VIPs stand to access significantly more written 
works and then subsequently enrich societal discourse. 
6. CONCLUSION 
VIP Treaty negotiations mark the culmination of movements 
calling for reexamination of IP policies that have traced somewhat 
parallel paths.  As discussions flesh out and move towards a 
potential final agreement, A2K, the WIPO Development Agenda, 
and VIP movements stand to enhance each other.169  Due to VIPs’ 
concentration in developing countries, a VIP treaty stands as at 
least a symbolic step towards WIPO’s real commitment to 
development under the Development Agenda.  Additionally, given 
 
than-the-movie-versions.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011) (noting that when reading, 
“you’re creating your own movie in a sense and decide the most important parts: 
how the characters speak, what they look like and what their surroundings are 
like”). 
167 See COPY/SOUTH RESEARCH GRP., supra note 5, at 133 (“[C]onversion of 
[written works] into accessible formats does not entail any loss of revenues for 
copyright owners.”). 
168 See Ruse-Khan, supra note 52, at 80 (noting that an optimal copyright 
system “does not only entail incentivizing the development and production of 
new knowledge capital via IP exclusivity, but also safeguards for access, use and 
dissemination of the existing building blocks of knowledge”). 
169 In fact, quite naturally, the WIPO Development Agenda already contains 
significant traces of A2K.  See Latif, supra note 53, at 115 (“Although the WIPO 
Development Agenda initiative was not only about A2K, A2K-related issues were 
clearly an important component of the proposals and ideas that the initiative was 
seeking to advance.”). 
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A2K’s emphasis on heightened IP balancing, providing copyright 
accommodations to VIPs recognizes such balancing.  Likewise, 
A2K and the WIPO Development Agenda arm VIPs with useful 
normative tools for pressing forward a copyright framework that 
can improve their access to accessible written works.  Thus, while a 
VIP treaty may appear to benefit only VIPs, it would move more 
meaningfully towards legitimizing IP movements concerned with 
balance in intellectual property protection.170 
VIPs provide a particularly suitable demographic to push 
forward A2K and the WIPO Development Agenda.  Indeed, 
defending a legal system which contributes to blocking VIPs from 
accessing written works in accessible formats proves difficult.  
Hence, even staunch treaty opponents often still “strongly 
endorse” providing VIPs improved access to accessible written 
works.171  Therefore, because VIPs afford a rather uncontroversial 
starting point, a VIP treaty offers an excellent launching pad to 
bolster attention to A2K and the WIPO Development Agenda in 
other contexts.  Developed countries’ increasing acknowledgement 
of such principles throughout treaty negotiations172—even if less 
direct—may signal that such a shift has already been at least 
preliminarily initiated. 
Ultimately, language from the Latin American proposal may 
perhaps best capture the symbiotic relationship between a VIP 
treaty, A2K and the WIPO Development Agenda—“the 
 
170 Indeed, similar observations have been made regarding the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS.  See id. at 101–02 (noting that for developing countries, the 
Doha Declaration was a “balanced and powerful message [that] had a wider 
significance beyond the WTO, because it signaled the importance of 
implementing intellectual property protection in a manner that is supportive of 
public-policy objectives”).  Likewise, scholars have similarly viewed the World 
Summit on the Information Society’s (“WSIS”) Geneva Declaration’s 
acknowledgement of A2K principles as providing a significant step forward.  See 
id. at 107 (“[T]he WSIS appeared as a landmark development for the emerging 
A2K movement, because the movement succeeded, for the first time in including 
A2K concerns in a major policy document that was endorsed by heads of state 
and governments.”).  Successful agreement upon a VIP treaty serves to provide 
yet another significant development in acknowledgment of A2K’s principles, as 
well as meaningful implementation of the WIPO Development Agenda. 
171 AAP et al., Comment, supra note 137, at 2.  
172 See, e.g., EU VIP Treaty, supra note 71, Preface, para. 1 (“[R]ecognizing the 
importance of accessibility to the achievement of equal opportunities in all 
spheres of society . . . .”); see U.S. VIP Treaty, supra note 72, at 2 [pmbl., para. 4] 
(“[R]ecognizing the public interest in maintaining a balance between the interests 
of authors and users . . . .”). 
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importance of copyright protection as an incentive for literary and 
artistic creation, and as a means to ensure that everyone has the 
opportunity to participate in the cultural life of the community, to 
enjoy the arts and share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits.”173  Importantly, it emphasizes that a VIP treaty would 
not endorse a complete erosion of copyright’s traditional incentive 
structures, and does not seek to completely strip rights holders of 
their full bundle of exclusion rights.  To the contrary, a VIP treaty 
would strive to best provide all members of society an opportunity 
to access the fruits of copyright’s incentives framework.  
Nevertheless, past trends have proved that developed countries 
often successfully blunt attempts at rebalancing IP law.174  VIPs, 
however, have offered IP movements a difficult-to-refute cause, 
and the latest 2011 VIP treaty proposal shows progress towards 
meaningful compromise between developing and developed 
interests.  Should effective compromise continue to progress 
forward, successful passage of a VIP treaty will provide a 
meaningful step towards recognition of striking a more ideal 
balance in IP as championed by A2K and the WIPO Development 
Agenda. 
 
 
173 Latin American VIP Treaty, supra note 69, Annex. 
174 See supra Section 2 (providing examples of developing countries calling for 
international copyright law reforms and developed countries’ resistance to such 
reforms). 
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